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Please note: This lecture draws upon the article Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy 
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
915-988 (2003), reprinted at 34 THE SECURITIES LAW REVIEW (Donald C. 
Langevoort, ed., 2004), a more formal development of its ideas which should be 





FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE AND SCANDALS 
The late 1990s was a period of expansion and innovation that comes once a generation.  
Technological exploitation enabled widespread Internet use and proliferation of telecom 
infrastructure.  In 1996 hardly anyone used email and a minority used cell phones; by 2000, nearly 
everyone used both regularly. 
Heady financial times  draw to investing millions of people who lack business knowledge 
and to business thousands who lack moral scruples.  The combination produces exaggeration of  
achievements and obfuscation of setbacks.  With flushness fueling financial fantasies, accounting 
and governance become obstacles to overcome or burdens to meet, not tools to promote quality 
financial reporting or disciplined management oversight.  The spirit of the times overcomes the spirit 
of the rules. 
The hallucinations of the late 1990s began to end in March 2000, when investors recognized 
that a financial bubble had arisen and drove stock prices plunging.  The unraveling of Enron, a direct 
product of the era’s financial fantasia, began in late 2001 and escalated in 2002.  An accounting 
meltdown at Global Crossing began to tip the dominos in February 2002. 
A wave of reported debacles followed in the Spring, but characterized by distinct 
misbehavior.  The widely-publicized cases, Adelphia and Tyco, involved sweetheart insider loans, 
stories of greed not accounting, except in the same sense that Al Capone’s schemes were about tax 
evasion.   
Other accounting corruption stories long in the background became front-page news, 
including household names like AOL Time Warner, Rite Aid, and Xerox.  The parade of disparate, 
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illicit, and over-exposed tales ran to ImClone Systems, whose CEO allegedly told his father and 
daughter about company prospects in violation of federal securities law. 
Investors may have been able to properly classify these unrelated events for a while.  Enron 
and the other ongoing accounting scandals were about ways companies dress up accounts to obscure 
the truth; the self-dealing loans at Adelphia and Tyco were relatively ordinary (if despicable) 
incidents of corporate misconduct; events at ImClone concerned arcane regulations governing 
insider trading.   But non-experts in accounting, corporate governance, and securities law aren’t 
good at maintaining these distinctions (especially when they’ve just lost enormous investment 
capital). 
The gales of Enron and Global Crossing were strong and these other episodes amplified 
them.  The tipping point arrived in June with a pure accounting deception so large there was no 
turning back from an Act of Congress, even for President Bush and other free-market Republicans–
I’m referring to WorldCom, as well as at its capacity-swap trading partner Qwest. 
Not coincidentally, several characteristics adorned each of the four massively scandal-ridden 
companies—Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, and Qwest.  Most important but least noted is that 
they were all new: WorldCom went public in 1995, Global Crossing and Qwest both went public in 
1997, and Enron revolutionized during the late1990s from a stodgy natural gas company into a 
broadband and risk management mirage.  Also, these four companies, which I call the Big Four 
Frauds, used more appalling accounting and showed more shocking governance laxity, than other 
aggressions of the period (or any other).  Third, all used as their outside auditor the once-venerable 
and now dead Arthur Andersen.  
The multi-billion dollar scale of the Big Four Frauds wrought proportional personal losses 
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for millions, all amid the imploding financial bubble that stripped several trillion dollars more.  The 
combination produced a natural tendency to overreact, provoking wholesale questioning of the 
quality of American financial reporting. 
Some perspective was in order, but rarely broke through.  One would have classified the 
disparate scandals better.  This would have emphasized that Enron was essentially a Ponzi scheme, 
diabolically engineered and disguised by a few pathological fiends; that the other companies 
suffered from tele-dot-com mania going into the balloon, and tele-dot-com fever when it deflated.  
More broadly, everyone could have been reminded that when the balloon held helium, few 
complained of manifestly aggressive accounting when business performance was measured by 
revenue not earnings, eyeballs hitting Internet sites not dollars customers paid.  But victims don’t 
like to be blamed.  
Despite such perspectives—unpopular but plausible—cries to do something were loud and 
could not be ignored.  The result was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
THE ACT 
Despite heavy advertising as the most “sweeping reform” of business practices since the New 
Deal,  the Act is more sweep than reform.  Most provisions codify existing law and practice or tinker 
at the edges– exceptions relate to auditing and internal control, but even there changes are not 
“sweeping reform.” 
I theorize that the Act’s rhetoric-reality gap reflects uncertainty about how bad things are on 
the one hand and public perceptions that they are certainly awful on the other.   Sweeping rhetoric 
lets the public think Congress is doing something; limited substance enables regulators to hold back 
in case less is wrong than many think.  This view helps to explain the Act’s call for 9 studies 
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investigating a wide range of potential cancers, addressing targets in a way that can be seen to 
threaten them into cleaning up their acts. 
On the merits, the Act’s changes are more likely to have psychological than substantive 
effects.  And these may be significant. 
I’ll highlight a few examples of most concern to counseling the public company: auditing,  
controls, and certification. 
AUDITING BOARD 
Of the Act’s many provisions, the silver bullet is its creation of the new auditing oversight 
board nicknamed Peak-A-Boo.  Compared to the series of successive bodies overseeing the auditing 
profession over the decades, several differences stand out, intended to strengthen the board’s 
independence from the profession: it is a creature of statute, not grace; a majority of its five 
members will be non-CPAs; and it will be funded by public company shareholders, not the auditing 
profession. 
Despite these changes, the perception of greater independence may be more structure than 
substance.  Standard setters and practicing auditors always operated under threat of SEC rebuke.  
Client advice was invariably couched in terms of whether a position would pass muster at the SEC.  
That threat remains the key disciplining power that will apply with the new board.  To that extent, 
less has changed than meets the eye. 
AUDIT FIRMS 
As for auditing firms, independence is strongly influenced by what role auditors assume for 
clients in addition to certifying financial statements.   Roles mushroomed in the past few decades as 
firms became multi-national, multi-service conglomerates.  
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Curtailing the influence of these activities, SEC reforms implemented in 2000 defined a 
range of services auditors could not render and still remain independent. Amid the pressure enabling 
and resulting from those efforts, all firms have withdrawn from those businesses, selling or divesting 
them. 
Though these steps rendered the point substantially moot, the Act restricts them, much as an 
errant cowboy locks the stable after his wild horses have escaped.  Strikingly, the Act restates and 
restricts exactly the same services restricted by the SEC reforms, using almost exactly the same 
language. 
Untouched are tax and compliance services, still big money for the firms and a big portion of 
fees paid by registrants, though Peak-A-Boo has hinted it may touch them. 
AUDIT PARTNERS 
To enhance the independence of individual auditors within firms, the Act requires auditors to 
rotate lead and reviewing partners so that neither role is performed by the same accountant for the 
same company for more than five consecutive years.  As with many other Act provisions, this 
references Enron and WorldCom, both audited by small, local Andersen offices where the lead 
partner developed a client relationship so lucrative that his independence may have been impaired.  
Nice going, but this is one of numerous examples of the Act federalizing as law existing auditing 
standards (though existing auditing standards set the limit at seven years which the Act cuts to five). 
Stronger medicine is being considered, through one of the Act’s 9 studies.  One possibility is 
to mandate rotation of firms.  A virtue of this approach is it would probably encourage more 
conservative accounting when choices are possible.  The first thing new auditors tend to do is hunt 
for aggressive accounting and pressure to reverse it.  The looming threat of such second guessing 
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would ordinarily induce incumbent auditors to insist on the more conservative approach at the 
outset.  
Forensic accounting is dedicated to energetic identification of accounting aggression, 
irregularity or fraud.  Accounting purists constantly wonder why that energy cannot be deployed 
during ordinary audits.  One reason is the length of the firm-client relationship; one solution is to cap 
it. 
AUDIT COMMITTEES 
The greatest intensification of the Act appears to bear down on audit committees, who are 
charged specifically with various mandates.  Most remain codifications.    
 I’ll single out the oddest one for brief comment.    Either a committee includes a financial 
expert or the company must disclose why not.  First, stock exchange rules have required an expert 
for many years.  Second, state law requires all directors to understand how to read a financial 
statement and spot red flags.  Third, you can’t be effective on an audit committee unless you have 
that skill.  
This is why this is the oddest of the Act’s audit committee rules: it is the most critical, 
already required by exchange and state rule, and yet is left voluntary on a have-or-disclose basis. 
TOP OFFICERS 
New CFO/CEO internal control certification rules look to prevent those officers from hiding 
behind the defense of ignorance, a defense Enron’s executives invoked in Congressional hearings.  
The rules may be sensible, but few knowledgeable people believed those executives and none but 
the most sympathetic or gullible absolved them from responsibility.  
On the other hand, an easy case can be made that the rules are incoherent.  The rules require 
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CFOs to design internal controls and turn around and certify their integrity.  It is this exercise in self-
review that is the central criticism of auditors performing the non-audit services the Act prohibits.  It 
was this exact threat that produced the scandals at WorldCom, where the CFO deliberately overrode 
internal controls to fabricate results.   
A more sensible provision would call for one financial officer to design controls and another 
to test and certify them.  (Incidentally, some companies, smarter than Congress in such matters, 
appear to be taking a version of this step in creating the new position of Chief Risk Officer.) 
CONGRESS 
The dog that didn’t bark bears mention: the Act does nothing about stock option accounting.  
 FASB has struggled for years to produce accounting rules that faithfully reflect the costs of stock 
options to shareholders. It has met political resistance at every turn, and Congress gives it no help in 
the Act.  
Devolutionists could applaud Congressional restraint against enacting accounting rules as 
federal law.  But the Act’s entry into several other state law areas shows that its reticence on stock 
options is not the product of this principle.  
Congressional reticence on accounting for stock options as an expense in the income 
statement can alternatively be explained by the Act’s central codifying characteristic: no such extant 
rule exists, so there was nothing to codify.  This reticence illuminates the Act’s implicit political  





It is impossible to prove whether the Act will work.  But a moment’s reflection on the Big 
Four Fraud compared with the Act suggests that cultural features promoted the scandals that are not 
amenable to regulation, including investor exuberance, a periodic economic boom fostering 
economic hallucinations and mass stock market psychosis. 
Suppose Global Crossing were created several years on, after the tele-dot-com burst and after 
the Act took effect.  Would it attract the capital it did?  What, if anything, would have impaired its 
accounting deceptions?  The Act?  What, if anything, might rejuvenate temptation?  Market 
madness?  Which is likely to dominate, the Act or madness? 
If history is your guide, emotions beat governance.  Put forensically, the late 1990s market 
exuberance did not arrive out of the blue, but follows a pattern.  Regulatory breakdown is less likely 
than rationality breakdown the cause of schemes such as Global Crossing or Enron. 
Standard-setting is critical, and must be tended, but regulations are not a final fix to forfend 
financial fraud.   For that, a deeper investor and market rationality is required that history repeatedly 
teaches is unlikely to arrive.  The best the regulator can hope for is deterring, not preventing.  And 
modest acts, with rich rhetoric, may be best suited.   It appears to be stiffening some spines at audit 
firms, on audit committees, in board rooms, among corporate advisors—and potentially reinforcing 
all these among state law judges articulating corporate law. 
DELAWARE COURTS 
Cause and effect is difficult to prove but it is notable that 5 important Delaware cases in the 
past year, in the Act’s wake, have the Delaware Supreme Court reversing decisions of the Delaware 
Chancery Court that had favored managers.   
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All five are close cases, suggested by the Chancery’s rulings, and in one case by the unusual 
fact that the Supreme Court’s decision was a divided 3-2.  The issues in the cases spanned the range 
of matters one sees in a basic Corporation law class:  
● in Saito v. McKesson HBOC, the trial court construed narrowly a shareholder’s statutory 
and common law right of access to books and records relating to merged company’s financial and 
accounting records generated before the merger and by third parties and the Supreme Court reversed 
in part by broadening its interpretation of the scope of that right; 
● in Texlon v. Meyerson, the trial court granted summary judgment on claims of breach of 
the duty of loyalty under the corporate opportunity doctrine and for the payment of excessive 
executive compensation, and the Supreme Court reversed this disposition as premature given 
conflicting evidence as to whether the corporate insider ever presented the corporate opportunity to 
the board, whether the board was independent, and what contributions the executive whose 
compensation was in issue made to the corporation; 
● in Parfi Holding v. Mirror Image Internet, the trial court held that an arbitration clause in 
the agreement under which minority stockholders bought their stock rendered their claims subject to 
arbitration, and the Supreme Court reversed because the claims were for breach of fiduciary duty 
and therefore not claims based in the written contract; 
● MM Companies v. Liquid Audio, the trial court held that a board’s defensive action to 
enlarge its size from 5 to 7 did not implicate Blasisus and satisfied Unocal, and the Supreme 
reversed on both points, requiring the board to show both a “compelling justification” and that the 





●  Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, deal protection provisions in a merger agreement were 
invalid where they effectively precluded the board from entertaining superior offers with no 
fiduciary out.  
Whether particular Act provisions bear teeth, the rhetorical signals they send are strong, and 
these Delaware cases suggest a substantive ripple effect.  
CONCLUSION 
Rhetoric is powerful, whether on courts or accompanying legislation.  In the case of the Act, 
the sweeping rhetoric was echoed dutifully throughout American power centers.  On its own, that 
stiffens spines and promotes integrity, which in turn can justify investor confidence.  And there may 
not be much more a legislator can do. 
 
 
